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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through )' 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, , 
VS. 
GENERAL On.. COMPANY, a Utah ,. 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 11178 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in eminent domain, brought to con-
demn certain land for highway purposes. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the first trial of this action the jucy returned a ver-
dict of $4,147.52 as just compensation for the taking of 
defendant's property. Upon defendant's motion the trial 
court granted a new trial or, in the alternative, an additur 
of $15,000.00 
Plaintiff declined tile additur, and at the second trial 
the court entered judgment upon a verdict of the jury in 
the amount of $22,050.00, plus interest and costs. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
By this appeal plaintiff seeks reversal of the order of 
the trial court granting defendant's request for a new trial 
and directing that judgment be entered upon the verdict 
of the jury returned in the first trial of this action. In 
the alternative plaintiff requests a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parcel of land in question, consisting of 1.04 acres 
more or less, occupied at the time of taking (March 19, 
1964, the date of service of swnmons herein) the north-
west comer of the intersection of 1500 South Street and 
University Avenue, Provo City. The plaintiff sought to 
condemn the property in question in exercise of its right 
of eminent domain for the purpose of constructing an ac-
cess route to interstate highway I-15 in the nature orf an 
extension of South University Avenue. 
At :the time of taking (March 19, 1964), SoutJh Uni-
versitly Avenue adjacent to the property was unpaved, and 
the character of land use in the area was primarily agri-
cultural (R. 147). The general location of the proposed 
freeway access route, however, had been public knowledge 
since at least as early as February, 1958 (R. 118). In 
ru:iticipation of construction of the access route as an ex-
tension of South University Avenue, the land on both 
sides of the road was rezoned September 21, 1959, from 
an agricultural classification to a "special highway service 
zone" ( R. 150) in which the primary permitted uses are 
motels, filling stations and restaurants (R. 159). 
Actual development of the area for these purposes 
did not begin until approximately two years after the tak· 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
ing, the access route being completed and opened for use 
in late fall, 1966 (R. 126). 
At the first trial, four expert witnesses testified as to 
the value of the subject property. Defendant's witnesses 
testified to values of $25,800.00 and $24,010.00 respectively 
(Transcript 91, 163). Plaintiff's witnesses both testified 
to a value of $3,120.00 (Transcript 215, 23). 
At the second trial defendant's witnesres testified to 
values of $23,700.00 and $24,010.00 (R. 247-49, 327-29). 
Plaintiff's witnesses again testified to a value of $3,120.00 
(R. 384, 476). 
Defendant's witnesses testified that at the time of tak-
ing the influence of tJhe proposed development on the value 
of the subject property was direct and certain and accord-
ingly based their evaluations in part on subsequent tran-
sactions in the area and on transactions on West Center 
Street involving service station sites (R. 219-47, 290-327). 
Plaintiff's witnesses testified that at the time of taking 
the influence of the proposed development on the value 
was speculative and remote (R. 480-81) and accordingly 
based their estimates solely on transactions on South Uni-
versity occurring prior to the time of taking (R. 369-83, 
448-75). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THlE (X)IURT ERRED IN GRANTING A NEW TRI-
AL. 
At the conclusion of the first trial, the court granted 
defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that "the 
verdict of the jury on the issues of just compensation was, 
as a matter of law, inadequate .... " 
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Rule 59(a) (5) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
for the granting of a new trial on the ground of "excessive 
and inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
The narrow limits within which a trial court is justi-
ied in disregarding the verdict of a jury have been stated 
as follows in Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 
276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960): 
"We do not suggest that the jury is infallible nor that 
the court should abdicate its undoubted supervisory 
responsibility to see that justice is done by setting 
aside a verdict if it plainly appears that there has 
been a miscarriage of justice. But this is done with 
reluctance and only when it is plainly apparent that 
the jury has abused its prerogatives by refusing to 
accept uncontroverted credible evidence or otherwise 
ignoring or misapplying proven facts or established 
law. If the courts were ready to override jury ver-
dicts whenever they disagreed with them, the right of 
trial by jury would be effectively abrogated and the 
trial may as well be to the court in the first place." 10 
Utah 2d 282. 
At the first trial of this action (as also the second) 
there was conflict in the evidence as to value between 
plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses. ']}he unique func-
tion of the jury is to weigh such conflicting evidence and 
the credibility of the witnesses. The jury did so and con-
cluded, apparently, that plaintiff's witnesses were to be be-
lieved and that defendant's witnesses were not to be be-
lieved .. 
In granting defendant's motion for a new trial, the 
court in effect substituted its judgment as to the credi-
bility of the witnesses for that of the jury. The jury was 
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in possession of substantial evidence to sustain its verdict 
and the granting of a new trial was, in the light of this 
Court's language in Lund, an a!buse of its discretion. As 
the Court stated in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 
P.2d 201 (1961): 
"The trial judge should not grant a new trial, merely 
because in his opinion the amount of the award was 
insufficient or excessive. Such action is warranted 
only when to the trial judge, 'it seems clear that the 
jucy has misapplied or failed to take into account 
proven facts; or misunderstood or disregarded the law; 
or made findings clearly against the weight of the 
evidence.'" 12 Utah 2d 354. 
In that case the trial court was affirmed in granting 
a new trial because "the jury had clearly been mistaken or 
misconceived the facts or the law on the amount of the 
damage .... " 12 Utah 2d 353. 
Compare Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller 
Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964), a condemna-
tion case, which this Court remanded for a new trial where 
"the trial court clearly indicated that in his opinion the 
jury verdict was less than the smallest amount which 
the jury could reasonably award under the evidence 
. . . .'' 15 Utah 2d 320. 
Our case is distinguishable from Porcupine Reserv<>ir 
in that the verdict was within the limits of the evidence 
as to value. Applying the standard of that case to our 
facts, it is clear the trial court erred in granting the new 
trial. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
OF MARKET VALUES OF PROPERTIES AFFECI'ED 
BY TIIE IMPROVEMENT IN QUESTION. 
It is a well established principle of law that: 
"As a general thing, under the greatly prevailing view, 
the owner of land taken in eminent domain is not en-
titled to recover an increase or enhancement in the 
value of his land due to the proposed improvement, al-
though there is authority to the contrary." 27 Am. 
Jur. 2d 79, Eminent Domain § 283 (1966). 
A:s a logical corollary of this principle, it is held that 
evidence of the market values of comparable properties, 
which values have been increased by the proposed improve-
ment, is inadmissible. Thus State Highway Comm'n of 
South lbakota v. Lacey, 79 S.Dak. 451, 113 N.W.2d 50, 
(1962) held that where selling prices of other properties 
in the locality reflected an important enhancement of value 
because of the building of a highway for which the con-
demnee's property was taken, such selling prices were in-
admissible to determine the award to the condemnee. 
Similarly in Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 
157 N.E.2d 209 (1959) the sales price of other property 
reflecting a substantial enhancement of value because of 
the turnpike project in question was held inadmissible on 
the question of the value of property taken for the project. 
City of Houston v. Collins, 310 S.W. 2d 697 (Tex. 1958) 
held evidence as to sales subsequent to the taking inad-
missible unless the price sought to be offered after the 
taking was not derived from the sale orf any property bene-
fited by the improvement in question. 
In this case the trial court admitted defendant's ev;-
I 
\ 
r 
l 
I 
\ 
I 
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dence both (a) as to the value of the subject property as 
affected by the improvement and (b) as to other property 
the value of which was influenced by the improvement. 
Thus defendant's witnesses, Wilbur R. Harding and 
Werner Kiepe, both testified to the sale of certain prop-
erty located at 900 South Street and University Avenue 
(R. 234-38, 320-22). The sale took place in September 
of 1965 (R. 235). Harding testified that the "motivating 
factor" in the sale was the prospect of traffic flow from 
the completion of the freeway (R. 235). 
The same witness, Harding, testified to the value of 
that part of defendant's parcel not taken, using as the 
basis of his evaluation the capitalization of a lease between 
defendant and Holiday Inn entered into in the summer Of 
1965 (R. 238-44). 
Under the authorities cited, the admission of this evi-
dence was substantial and prejudicial error and plaintiff is 
entitled to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the trial court erred (1) in granting 
defendant's motion for a new trial and (2) in admitting 
evidence of values as affected by the improvement Under 
these circumstances plaintiff is entitled to either (1) judg-
ment on the verdict returned in the first trial or (2) a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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